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A B S T R A C T
The implications of hospital quality competition depend on what type of quality affects choice of hos-
pital. Previous studies of quality and choice of hospitals have used crude measures of quality such as
mortality and readmission rates rather than measures of the health gain from speciﬁc treatments. We
estimate multinomial logit models of hospital choice by patients undergoing hip replacement surgery
in the English NHS to test whether hospital demand responds to quality as measured by detailed patient
reports of health before and after hip replacement. We ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in
average health gain increases demand by up to 10%. The more traditional measures of hospital quality
are less important in determining hospital choice.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Many European healthcare systems have recently extended pa-
tients’ right to choose their provider of elective hospital care
(Vrangbaek et al., 2012). One of the aims is to encourage hospitals
to compete for patients by improving quality (Besley and Ghatak,
2003). A prerequisite for this is that patients’ choice of hospital is
inﬂuenced by quality (Faber et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2004). But
quality is multi-dimensional and the implications of increased in-
centives to compete on quality depend on which aspects of hospital
quality affect demand: if demand responds to a limited set of quality
dimensions then hospital attempts to attract patients may be
misdirected.
Studies of quality and choice of hospital have measured quality
by mortality rates, either at hospital level or for speciﬁc condi-
tions (e.g. Sivey, 2008; Beckert et al., 2012; Moscone et al., 2012;
Gaynor et al., 2012; McConnell et al., 2016), readmission rates
(McConnell et al., 2016; Moscone et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al.,
2012), or hospital reputation and composite scores (Bundorf et al.,
2009; Pope, 2009; Ruwaard and Douven, 2014; Varkevisser
et al., 2010, 2012).1 See Brekke et al. (2014) for an overview. The
studies typically report a positive association between quality mea-
sures and hospital demand.
But these quality measures, even those that are condition-
speciﬁc, are incomplete, revealing little about the changes in health
and functioning that patients will experience as the result of treat-
ment (Appleby and Devlin, 2004). In this paper we use newly
available data to examine whether choice of hospital is also inﬂu-
enced by qualitymeasures based on detailed patient reports of health
and functioning before and after treatment.
Since April 2009, all hospitals in England have been required to
collect patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) for National
Health Service (NHS)-funded patients undergoing hip and knee re-
placement, varicose vein surgery or groin hernia repair (Department
of Health, 2008).2 PROMs are detailed validated questionnaires used
to measure patients’ health status, functioning, and health-related
quality of life before and after treatment. Hospital quality mea-
sures derived from PROMs improve over ‘failure’ measures such as
mortality or emergency readmission rates in several ways. First, they
capture more dimensions of health and more sensitively (Appleby
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1 Early studies from the US include Folland (1983), Luft et al. (1990), Burns and
Wholey (1992), Hodgkin (1996), Tay (2003), Howard (2005) and Ho (2006).
2 Similar initiatives are underway or being considered in other health systems,
including Sweden (Rolfson et al., 2011), Australia (Arthroplasty Clinical Outcomes
Registry, 2015), Canada (McGrail et al., 2012), the Netherlands (Landelijke Registratie
Orthopedische Implantaten, 2013) and the US (Basch et al., 2013).
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and Devlin, 2004; Gutacker et al., 2013). Second, they embodymuch
better adjustment for case-mix, because they incorporate the rich
pre-operative PROMs data. Finally, PROMs reﬂect the patients’ views
on their health and health improvement. Hospital-speciﬁc average
risk-adjusted changes in patient health status have been pro-
duced and disseminated online to support the Department of
Health’s ambition that they would be used “by patients and [general
practitioners (GPs)] exercising choice” (Department of Health, 2008,
p. 6).3,4
We use newly available PROMs-based quality data to estimate
a multinomial logit model of patient choice of hospital for hip re-
placement surgery to test whether hospital demand responds to the
aspects of quality captured by PROMs, as well as to more conven-
tional measures such as mortality and readmission rates.5 Our main
empirical strategy relies on the use of lagged hospital quality vari-
ables to identify the effect of quality on hospital choice: patients
are assumed to use quality information that is made publicly avail-
able with a one-year lag and that can therefore not be affected by
current choices. We test the robustness of our results by estimat-
ing models with hospital ﬁxed effects, and by using closely matched
emergency hip replacement patients as a control group.
We ﬁnd that patients are more likely to choose providers pro-
ducing greater health gains. In our baseline speciﬁcation, the
elasticity of hospital demandwith respect to the average health gain
(measured in terms of the Oxford Hip Score) is 1.4, whereas the
demand elasticities with respect to the readmission rate and the
mortality rate are −0.02 and −0.004. A one standard deviation in-
crease in the health gain increases demand by up to 9.8% whereas
one standard deviation increases in readmission andmortality rates
reduce demand by 6.8% and 0.7%, respectively. This suggests that
hospitals’ abilities to improve their patients’ health reﬂect an im-
portant dimension of quality that is valued by patients and not
captured by other quality measures. Our robustness analyses, both
with emergency patients as a control group and using hospital ﬁxed
effects, also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant, though smaller, marginal
willingness to travel for higher PROM quality and lower elastici-
ties of demand. For example, using emergency patients as a control
group we ﬁnd the demand elasticity to PROM quality to be 0.6 and
a one standard deviation increase in health gain is estimated to in-
crease demand by 4.4%.
Our study makes a number of contributions. It is the ﬁrst to
explore whether hospital demand responds to quality as mea-
sured by average health gains derived from patient self-reported
outcomemeasures. Second, we make novel use of pre-operative in-
dividual level PROMs data to explore whether sicker patients travel
farther and choose hospitals with higher quality of care. Such self-
selection can bias performance assessments (‘distance bias’) and
create perverse incentives in the context of e.g. pay-for-performance
schemes (Etzioni et al., 2013; Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999). Pre-
vious studies have either relied on instrumental variable approaches
to allow for the effect of unobserved pre-operative health status on
demand (Geweke et al., 2003; Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999) or
have used simple measures of comorbidity and past utilisation. Our
data have rich information on pre-operative health, which allows
us to address this question directly. Third, our paper contributes to
the small literature on hospital choice in publicly funded health
systems where prices are regulated and demand is rationed by
waiting time (Beckert et al., 2012; Gaynor et al., 2012; Moscone et al.,
2012; Sivey, 2012). Our analysis differs from Beckert et al. (2012),
who also study choice of provider for hip replacement surgery in
England, in that we use provider quality measures that are
procedure-speciﬁc and more directly related to the quality of care
provided6, explore the role of pre-operative health status, andmodel
the entire NHS market, including private providers of NHS-funded
care.
More broadly, the analysis relates to the literature on hospital
report cards, which has mostly focused on the publication of cor-
onary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery quality scores in a number
of US states. For example, Chou et al. (2014) investigate whether
information on quality gives stronger incentives to improve care for
hospitals that face more competition. They ﬁnd that after the online
publication of CABG report cards in Pennsylvania, hospitals in more
competitive areas used more resources per patient and had lower
mortality for more severe patients than those in less competitive
areas. Wang et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the probability of patients re-
ceiving CABG surgery from low-performing surgeons was
signiﬁcantly reduced following the publication of report cards. In
contrast, Epstein (2010) failed to detect changes in referrals fol-
lowing the introduction of report cards in Pennsylvania compared
to the counterfactual state Florida, and this may be due to refer-
ring physicians already having expectations about the relative
performance of cardiac surgeons. The result is consistent with
Dranove and Sfekas (2008) who ﬁnd that the introduction of report
cards in New York State was less effective when the ratings con-
ﬁrmed prior beliefs about quality. Dranove et al. (2003) found that
the introduction of report cards led to a reduction in average se-
verity with doctors trying to avoid high-risk patients. Cutler et al.
(2004) observed improvements in quality for New York State hos-
pitals that received a negative report card, suggesting that healthcare
providers are responsive to quality reporting. This literature anal-
yses either aggregate demand patterns or individual choice behaviour
using discrete choice models (similar to the approach adopted in
this study) and takes quasi-experimental approaches or panel data
techniques to establish causality.
In the next section we describe the data and in Section 3 we set
out the econometric model and our strategy to mitigate potential
endogeneity bias. In Section 4 we present the estimated marginal
utilities of different aspects of quality and other hospital charac-
teristics and show how these vary with observed patient
characteristics. Section 5 reports estimates of the effect of provid-
ers’ quality on their own demand and on demand of their
competitors. In Section 6 we discuss the key results.
3 The English NHS is funded by general taxation and there are no charges to pa-
tients (except for a small charge for dispensed medicines). Providers receive a
nationally set prospective price for hip replacement paid for by the patient’s Primary
Care Trust from its capitated budget. There is a list system in general practice and
patients wishing to access elective care must be referred to a hospital by their GP.
If a hospital specialist decides the patient should be treated she is placed on a waiting
list. Patients have the right to be treated at any qualiﬁed provider (NHS or private).
Providers must accept all clinically appropriate referrals from GPs and cannot close
their waiting lists to new patients.
4 Some patients might access this information directly, whereas others might rely
on their GPs, who act as their agent, to retrieve, interpret and communicate this in-
formation. In some instances, patients may not even be willing or able to make a
choice and their referring GP may choose the most appropriate hospital for them,
i.e. the GP acts as an agent to the patient. It is generally not possible to distinguish
between decision makers using administrative data. For simplicity, we will hence-
forward denote the decision-maker as the patient.
5 Information on the average change in PROM scores by hospital, including the
change in the Oxford Hip Score as used in our analysis, is reported to the general
public through the NHS Choices website (http://www.nhs.uk/) and the Health & Social
Care Information Centre website (http://www.hscic.gov.uk/proms). The same public
sources also provide information on procedure-speciﬁc mortality, emergency re-
admission and revision rates.
6 Beckert et al. (2012) model hospital quality using hospital-wide mortality and
MRSA infection rates. Aggregate hospital level quality indicators, such as the summary
hospital mortality indicator (SHMI) used in the English NHS, do not correlate well
with procedure-speciﬁc outcome measures (Gravelle et al., 2014). In 2010/11, the
Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between SHMI and the quality measures used in this
study were −0.09 (change in OHS), −0.07 (emergency readmission rate), −0.005 (re-
vision rate) and 0.08 (mortality rate), respectively.
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2. Data
We use patient-level data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES)
for all elective admissions for patients aged 18 or over who under-
went NHS-funded primary (i.e. non-revision) hip replacement
surgery between April 2010 and March 2013 in NHS or private
providers.7 HES contains rich information on patients’ demograph-
ic and medical characteristics, small area of residence and on the
hospital stay. Privately funded patients are excluded from our
analysis.8 We also exclude patients attending providers with less
than 30 patients in that year.
We derive four patient variables from HES: age, gender, the
number of emergency admissions during the 365 days prior to their
hip replacement admission, and the number of Elixhauser comorbid
conditions recorded in admissions in the previous year (Elixhauser
et al., 1998; Gutacker et al., 2015a). These are available for all pa-
tients. As a measure of income deprivation we use the 2010 Index
of Multiple Deprivation (McLennan et al., 2011) to attribute to each
patient the proportion of residents in households claiming means-
tested beneﬁts in their Lower Super Output Area (LSOA).9 We
measure a patient’s distance from a hospital as the straight-line dis-
tance from the centroid of their LSOA.10
All NHS-funded hip replacement patients are invited to report
their health status and health-related quality of life before, and six
months after, surgery using a paper-based questionnaire. The pre-
operative PROM questionnaire is administered by the hospital either
as part of the admission process or during the last outpatient ap-
pointment preceding admission. The post-operative questionnaire
is administered by a central agency and posted to the patient. Par-
ticipation in the PROM survey is compulsory for providers but
optional for patients. Approximately 60% of patients provide com-
plete pre- and postoperative PROM questionnaires that can be linked
to their HES record (Gutacker et al., 2015b).
Each PROM questionnaire contains three instruments: the Oxford
Hip Score (OHS), the EuroQoL-5D (EQ-5D) descriptive system, and
the EuroQol Visual Analogue Scale (EQ-VAS). The OHS is a condition-
speciﬁc instrument with 12 questionnaire items regarding hip-
related functioning and pain (Dawson et al., 1996). Each item is
scored on a ﬁve-point scale, with four indicating no problems and
zero indicating severe problems. The overall score is calculated as
the sum of all items and ranges from zero (worst) to 48 (best). Both
EuroQol instruments are generic PROMs, i.e. they can be applied to
different health conditions (Brooks, 1996). Previous analysis showed
substantial correlation between the EQ-5D and OHS (Neuburger et al.,
2013). We focus on analysis with the OHS since it is a condition-
speciﬁc measure and hence plausibly more likely to affect hospital
choice for hip replacements. We report a choice model using the
EQ-5D quality measures as sensitivity check.
We use PROMs data in two ways. First, we use the risk-adjusted
hospital-speciﬁc OHS change scores computed and published by the
Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) as a measure of
hospital quality (Health & Social Care Information Centre, 2013b).
Data are reported by ﬁnancial years (April toMarch). The HSCIC case-
mix adjustment methodology takes into account a range of patient
characteristics including age, sex, pre-operative PROM score, socio-
economic status, comorbidity burden, whether the patient lives alone
as well as other indicators of disability (Department of Health, 2012).
The hospital-speciﬁc mean scores have been found to be robust to
missing data (Gomes et al., 2015). They are also unlikely to be af-
fected by survivorship bias since less than 0.1% of patients die during
the six-month follow-up. Second, in some of our models, we use
the information in the individual patients’ pre-operative PROMs ques-
tionnaires to investigate whether their choice of provider is affected
by pre-operative morbidity.
We also calculate risk-adjusted hospital-speciﬁc annual 28-
day emergency readmission, 28-day mortality rates and 1-year
revision rates after primary hip replacement surgery as additional
quality measures. We link our HES data to the Oﬃce of National Sta-
tistics death records and apply the HSCIC case-mix adjustment as
set out in the readmission outcome indicator speciﬁcation (Health
& Social Care Information Centre, 2013a).11,12 Quality metrics are not
calculated for hospitals that treat less than 30 elective hip replace-
ment patients in that year because they are considered too noisy
for analysis.
We group providers into seven categories used by the National
Patient Safety Agency (n.d.): NHS small/medium/large non-teaching
trust, NHS teaching trust, NHS specialised orthopaedic provider, NHS
multi-service provider, and NHS Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).13 We
also distinguish NHS hospitals from privately operated Indepen-
dent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) that treat NHS patients. The
size categorisation of NHS providers is based on the overall number
of beds available and providers’ annual revenue. Teaching trusts
receive additional funding from the English Department of Health
to train doctors and are more research active. Multi-service pro-
viders offer acute services aswell asmental health and/or community
services.14 Orthopaedic specialist hospitals only treat musculoskel-
etal conditions, and, like ISTCs, do not provide emergency care.
Finally, we derive from HES the proportion of patients in each
hospital who waited longer than 120 days between the special-
ist’s decision to add the patient to the waiting list and admission
to hospital for treatment (the inpatient wait). Patients dislike waiting
since health beneﬁts from treatment are postponed and they are
in pain and less mobile while waiting. Waiting times have been
shown to reduce the overall demand for NHS elective care (Gravelle
et al., 2002; Martin and Smith, 1999, 2003) and to inﬂuence choice
of provider (Beckert et al., 2012; Gaynor et al., 2012; Moscone et al.,
2012; Sivey, 2012). We focus on long waits because this is how
waiting time targets for NHS providers are deﬁned and thus re-
ported in the press if hospitals miss targets. We also conduct
sensitivity analysis using the median waiting time (in months) at
each provider.7 See Department of Health (2008) for procedure codes. We exclude patients who
had revision surgery. This ensures a more homogeneous sample and they are likely
to return to the hospital providing the initial hip replacement.
8 Approximately 16% of hip replacement surgeries are funded privately, either out-
of-pocket or through private insurance (Hunt et al., 2013). Privately funded patients
treated in the private sector are not included in HES and we do not have informa-
tion on them. We also exclude the small number (<2%) of patients treated in NHS
hospitals who are privately funded.
9 LSOAs have a mean population of 1500 and are constructed to be homoge-
neous with respect to tenure and accommodation type.
10 Some NHS trusts perform hip replacement surgery across multiple sites, but the
site codes for NHS hospitals are often poorly recorded in HES. Also, quality infor-
mation for NHS providers is only recorded at trust level. We therefore locate hospitals
using the postcode of the trust headquarter (for NHS), which is consistently re-
corded, or the hospital site (for ISTCs). Analysis of complete data reveals that multi-
site operations are rare: approximately 80% of NHS trusts perform more than 80%
of their surgery in a single site.
11 This adjustment takes into account age (in 5-year bands), sex, socio-economic
status, comorbidity burden as captured by the Charlson index and the number of
emergency admissions in the last year.
12 One hospital-year observation was dropped from the analysis because infor-
mation on discharge date was missing for all patients.
13 During our study period, PCTs were responsible for purchasing care for their res-
ident population and, with the exception of the Isle of Wight PCT, did not provide
care themselves.
14 Such sites must provide at least two differing service functions, each with gross
internal ﬂoor area representing more than 20% of the total gross internal site ﬂoor
area for the whole site (Health & Social Care Information Centre, n.d.).
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3. Methods
3.1. Model speciﬁcation
We use a random utility choice model (McFadden, 1974). In our
baseline speciﬁcation utility of patient i = 1,…, N at provider j = 1,…,
J at time t = 1,…,T is:
U V
D D D Q W
ijt ijt ijt
ij d i ij d i ij d i jt q i
= +
= ′ + + + ′ +′ ′
−
ν
β β β β, , , ,2 3 12 3 jt w i j z i ijtZ−′ + ′ +1β β ν, , (1)
where Vijt depends on the distance from the patient’s residence to
the hospital Dij , hospital quality metrics Q jt−1, waiting time Wjt−1,
and a vector of time-invariant hospital characteristics Zj. The error
term νijt subsumes unobserved hospital characteristics and random
utility. Patients choose from a set of hospitals Mit . Assuming νijt is
iid extreme value yields themultinomial logit (MNL) model in which
the probability that patient i chooses hospital j is:
P
V
V
ijt
ijt
ij tj Mit
=
( )
( )′
′∈∑
exp
exp
(2)
We allow a non-linear effect of distance on utility by model-
ling linear, squared and cubic distance terms.15 We assume that
anticipated utility at a provider is based on its previous period’s
quality and waiting time because relevant information are avail-
able only with a lag (see section 3.2). Varkevisser et al. (2012) make
a similar assumption. In sensitivity checks, we also estimate models
with contemporaneous waiting time and quality scores.
We allow preferences to vary across patients according to their
observed characteristics. Thus the marginal utility of quality for
patient i is:
β β δq i q i qX, = + ′ (3)
and similar for distance, waiting time, and other hospital charac-
teristics. All continuous covariates in Xi are mean centred and base
categories for categorical characteristics are set to their mode. Thus,
the vectors of coeﬃcients βd, βd2 , βd3 , βq, βw, βz reﬂect the prefer-
ences of the reference patient.
We also estimatemodels which allow for unobserved patient het-
erogeneity in tastes over quality, with:
β β δ σ αq i q i q q iX, = + ′ + (4)
where σq is the standard deviation of a zero mean normal variable
and αi is an unobserved patient effect. The latter may capture, for
example, differences in the ability to access and interpret quality
information. This random coeﬃcient multinomial logit (RCMNL) or
mixed logit model (Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 2003), unlike
theMNLmodel, allows for unrestricted substitution patterns, thereby
relaxing the assumption of independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA). If σq = 0 then the RCMNLmodel reduces to theMNLmodel
in (1).
While the MNL model has a closed form solution that can be es-
timated via maximum likelihood, the RCMNL needs to be
approximated through simulation. To reduce the computational
burden16 we assume uncorrelated normally distributed random co-
eﬃcients for the quality metrics in Q jt−1 and no random coeﬃcients
for other covariates. The RCMNLmodel is estimated with maximum
simulated likelihood using 50 Halton draws.
All models are estimated in Stata 13 with clogit and the user-
written command mixlogit (Hole, 2007b). Standard errors are
clustered at the GP practice level to allow for GP-induced correla-
tion across choices by patients in a practice.
3.2. Endogeneity
A necessary condition for βq to be an unbiased estimate of the
marginal utility of hospital quality (up to a linear transformation)
is that the error term νijt is uncorrelated with any of the indepen-
dent variables, i.e. all observed variables are exogenous. This
condition may not hold for four reasons (Brekke et al., 2014; Gaynor
et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al., 2012).
First, hospitals may learn by doing so that higher volume pro-
viders have higher quality (Gaynor et al., 2005; Luft et al., 1987).
Thus, changes in demand could affect quality and induce simulta-
neity bias. A pre-PROM study with English 1997–2002 hip
replacement data found that 30-day in-hospital mortality was higher
in low volume hospitals that treated less than 100 patients per year
but found no volume effect above this threshold (Judge et al., 2006).
The average NHS hospital in our sample treated over 361 NHS pa-
tients per year and the average ISTC treated 155 NHS patients per
year as well as an unknown number of private patients. A more
recent study using the OHS reported no relationship between hos-
pital volume and quality (Varagunam et al., 2015). Furthermore, since
demand is likely to respond to past, rather than current, quality, our
modelling strategy prevents such bias: demand changes in period
t cannot affect quality in t−1. We therefore believe that simultane-
ity arising from the effect of volume on quality is not a problemwith
our data and modelling approach.
Second, because of short run capacity constraints, changes in
demand will also affect waiting time in the same period (Gaynor
et al., 2012).17 While our primary interest is not in the effect of
waiting time on demand, we are concerned that any bias intro-
duced through endogenous variables will ﬁlter through to our
estimate of βq (Wooldridge, 2002). Again, the use of lagged waiting
time measures guards against this type of bias.
Third, sicker patients may choose higher quality hospitals or hos-
pitals may turn away or discourage patients with characteristics that
make them less likely to achieve a large improvement in health
status. If such systematic selection occurs and is not controlled for
in the calculation of hospital quality scores then those scores would
in part be determined by patients’ choices or provider selection.
However, provider quality scores are adjusted for a rich set of de-
mographic, socio-economic, and morbidity patient characteristics,
including, in the case of PROMs, the patients’ self-reported pre-
operative health status. Hence, we do not believe that unobserved
patient selection is likely to bias the quality scores signiﬁcantly.
Finally, the error term in (1) may be the sum of unobserved hos-
pital characteristics ξ jt and iid random patient utility, i.e. ν ξijt jt ijt= + ε
where ξ jt affect demand and are correlated with observed covariates
(Ho, 2006; Jung et al., 2011). For example, hospitals in areas with
better amenities may attract better staff thereby ensuring higher
observed clinical quality but also unobserved interpersonal aspects
of quality. Our assumption that patients use information on pre-
vious period quality andwaiting times when choosing hospitals does
not remove omitted variable bias operating through unobserved non-
transitory hospital characteristics. We therefore undertake two types
15 The results are noticeably different from a model including distance and dis-
tance2 only, but are very similar to one that also included the fourth power.
16 Even after imposing those constraints the RCMNLmodel with our baseline spec-
iﬁcation still took over 3 weeks to compute on a high-performance computing
system.
17 It may also be that supply and demand are determined simultaneously, i.e. hos-
pitals react to demand shocks by adjusting their supply, e.g. by performing more
surgeries on weekends. We do not consider this in our model explicitly, although
the use of lagged waiting time circumvents this problem as well.
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of sensitivity analyses to explore the size of the potential omitted
variable bias. Our ﬁrst approach is to estimate the choice model in
(1) with alternative-speciﬁc time-invariant ﬁxed effects (FEs) (Ho,
2006; Hodgkin, 1996; Monstad et al., 2006; Sivey, 2012). These hos-
pital FEs capture the utility of non-transitory unobserved hospital
characteristics. The coeﬃcients on observed hospital characteris-
tics are now identiﬁed solely through variation within providers over
time, thereby removing any endogeneity bias operating through un-
observed time-invariant characteristics. However, since hospital
quality varies little over time (see Section 4.1) and we only observe
providers over three years this approach may yield imprecise es-
timates of the marginal utility of quality. Also, because the market
structure changes over time, due to the opening of new indepen-
dent sector treatment centres, the FEs do not correspond to observed
market shares in each time period. This may bias estimates if in-
cumbent providers differ systematically from new entries. We
therefore also estimate a model based on NHS trusts only, whose
numbers are relatively stable over time.
Our second approach is to follow Pope (2009) (see also Moscone
et al., 2012 and Gaynor et al., 2012) and gauge the possible impact
of unobserved hospital heterogeneity by using a control group of
emergency hip replacement patients whose choice of provider is
less responsive to quality and waiting time. The majority of emer-
gency hip replacement patients suffer from a fractured neck of the
femur as a result of a fall. The key idea is that in an emergency pa-
tients do not have time to compare the quality of hospitals (or at
least not as easily as for a planned procedure). The oﬃcial recom-
mendation is that hip fracture patients should be treated within 48
hours because further delays are linked to worse outcomes (NICE,
2011; Moja et al., 2012).18 Conversely, elective patients have time
to gather information, consult websites, family doctors, etc.We there-
fore expect elective patients to respond more to quality than
emergency patients, whose scope to choose providers based on
quality is clearly limited given the time-sensitive nature of their
condition.
Emergency hip replacement surgery is undertaken by the same
orthopaedic departments that provide elective surgery and so mea-
sures of the quality of elective care also apply. However, given the
relatively urgent nature of their condition, we expect provider choice
by emergency hip replacement patients to be largely unaffected by
publicly reported information on quality. To the extent that they
exercise choice they are likely to be inﬂuenced by distance to pro-
viders and time-invariant unobserved factors that also matter to
elective patients, such as long-standing reputation or dimensions
of accessibility not captured by our distance measure (e.g. parking
charges or connection to the public transport system).
If we assume that emergency patients’ demand is entirely in-
elastic to observed quality and that they do not wait,19 but value
the same unobserved hospital characteristics as elective patients,
then their true utility is given by:
U D D DijtEmer ij d iEmer ij d i
Emer
ij d i
Emer
ijt= ′ + + +
′ ′β β β ν, , ,2 32 3 (5)
If we estimate the model speciﬁed in (1) for emergency pa-
tients and ﬁnd ˆβqEmer ≠ 0 , we conclude that cov Q jt jt−( ) ≠1 0, ξ . If we
also assume that elective and emergency patients have the same
preferences for unobserved hospital characteristics, then the effect
of quality on elective demand, purged of omitted variable bias, is
β β βq qElec qEmerΔ = − . Hence, if these assumptions are valid, the strate-
gy is similar to a control group design. Since coeﬃcients in separate
MNL models may be scaled differently, we estimate a pooled model
for elective and emergency patients by interacting all covariates with
an indicator variable for emergency. This forces the scaling to be
the same. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are estimates
of βkΔ for k d d d q w z∈[ ], , , , ,2 3 .
If emergency patients choose using information on the same type
of quality as elective patients,20 or care about emergency quality that
correlates with it, or if unobserved hospital characteristics have dif-
ferent effects on choices by emergency and elective patients and
are correlated with observed quality, then βqΔ can no longer be in-
terpreted as an unbiased estimate of the effect of quality on elective
demand. If unobserved hospital factors are not correlated with
quality, then βkΔ reﬂects the differences in preferences between elec-
tive and emergency patients. In this case, we expect that βqΔ > 0:
elective patients will be more sensitive to quality than emergency
patients, at least in part because they have more time and can exert
more effort to identify high quality care providers.
Finally, we note that our ﬁndings may be of interest even without
a strict causal interpretation since they reveal whether patient
demand patterns tend to favour high-quality hospitals (e.g. hospi-
tals with a good reputation may invest more in quality because of
intrinsic motivation).
3.3. Elasticities, changes in demand and willingness to travel
The estimated coeﬃcients on hospital characteristics are esti-
mates of the marginal utilities. Since the utility function is unique
only up to a linear transformation, the coeﬃcients only convey in-
formation about the sign of marginal utility of hospital characteristics
and hence about the sign of the effect of quality on demand. The
ratio of marginal utilities (the negative of the marginal rate of sub-
stitution) is unaffected by linear transformations and so provides
quantitative information about patient preferences. We estimate the
reference patient’s willingness to travel (WTT) for a one standard
deviation (SD) increase in quality as:
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where D is the average distance to elective patients’ chosen hos-
pitals. WTT is the extra distance in kilometres that the reference
patient located the average distance away from a provider would
be willing to travel to that provider if its quality was increased by
SD(Q), where SD(Q) is averaged across hospitals and years. To allow
comparisons of WTTs across models based on different sample deﬁ-
nitions we evaluate all WTT at the values of D and SD(Q) for the
sample used to estimate our baseline speciﬁcation (see Table 2). We
estimate standard errors by the delta method (Hole, 2007a).
We are also interested in whether providers could attract more
patients by improving their quality. Expected demand at provider
j is Y Pjt i S ijtjt= ∑ ∈ , where S jt is the set of patients whose choice set
includes provider j, i.e. for whom j Mit∈ . Following Santos et al.
(2015) we calculate the average partial effect of a one SD increase
in quality on provider j’s demand, i.e. demand responsiveness to
quality, as:
18 The NHS choices website suggests that “if you think you’ve fractured your hip, you
will need to go to the hospital as soon as possible. Dial 999 to request an ambulance.
Try not to move while you’re waiting for the ambulance and make sure you keep warm”.
The text gives an idea of the criticality of the condition.
19 Emergency patients are usually treated within hours of their hip fracture, not
weeks or months. Analysis of our data revealed that elective waiting time is only
weakly correlated with the volume of emergency patients, suggesting that there is
separate supply for those two types of patients.
20 As with elective patients, we do not observe who chooses the hospital for emer-
gency hip replacement. This may be the patient, a family member, GP, or the
ambulance crew.
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We report the mean of (7) over all providers and years.
We calculate the elasticity of demand of provider j with respect
to own quality as:
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We report the mean of (8), weighted by providers’ predicted
demand ∑ ∈i S ijtjt P .
Finally, we compute the cross-elasticity of demand for provid-
er j with respect to the quality of provider j′ as:
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with j ≠ j′. Note that for some combinations of j and j′ the cross-
elasticity is zero because no patients have both providers in their
choice sets.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Our main sample is 171,472 elective hip replacement patients
treated in 228 providers during the period April 2010 to March
2013.21 Their average age is 68 years and 40% are male (Table 1).
The average pre-operative OHS is 17.4 and 9.5% of patients have been
admitted to hospital as an emergency at least once during the pre-
ceding 365 days (average number of admissions = 0.13). Self-reported
pre-operative OHS is only weakly correlated with past emergency
utilisation (ρ = −0.10) and the number of comorbidities (ρ = −0.14).
This suggests that past emergency utilisation and comorbidity burden
are poor proxies for current health status22 as experienced by the
patient.
On average, patients have a choice of 7 providers within 30 km,
with over 75% of patients having access to at least two different pro-
viders. Within 10 km there are on average 1.3 hospitals and over
14% of patients can choose between two or more providers. Con-
versely, 36% of patients have no options within a 10 km radius. To
reduce computational burden we restrict patient choice sets to the
50 nearest providers. The 556 patients (0.3% of the sample) who
chose a provider outside this set were dropped from the analysis.
Patients live on average 14.6 km from their chosen hospital. Fig. 1
shows that just under half (44.2%) of patients bypassed the local
hospital and nearly a tenth (9.9%) bypassed the nearest three hos-
pitals. On average, patients travel 5.0 km beyond their nearest
hospital to be treated.
The hospital waiting time and quality scores are lagged by one
year and are for ﬁnancial years 2009/10 to 2011/12. There are much
larger coeﬃcients of variation for hospital emergency re-admission,
revision and mortality rates than for OHS change scores. The pro-
vider OHS change scores are only weakly correlated with our waiting
timemeasure (ρ = −0.23), readmission rates (ρ = −0.28), revision rates
(ρ = −0.07) and mortality rates (ρ = −0.05). This suggests that choice
models that are restricted to failure rates may not even indirectly
pick up the effect of PROM measures on demand.
The intra-class correlation coeﬃcient (ICC) shows that just over
half of the observed variation in OHS (ICC = 57%) and our waiting
timemeasure (ICC = 59%) is between providers rather than over time.
This is less pronounced for readmission, revision andmortality rates
(all ICC < 40%). The limited within (i.e. over time) variation in pro-
vider characteristics impedes the identiﬁcation of associated
coeﬃcients in the ﬁxed effects model.
4.2. Regression results
4.2.1. Main effects
The results for the RCMNL model (see Appendix Table A1) are
very similar to the MNL model and the Hausman tests also did not
21 The number of providers varied over this period because of mergers, changes
in coding and market entry, especially with respect to private facilities. There were
155 providers in 2010/11, 202 in 2011/12, and 211 in 2012/13, of which 16 (11.5%)
in 2010/11, 62 (30.7%) in 2011/12, and 77 (36.5%) in 2012/13 were privately
operated.
22 The correlations between these measures and the EQ-5D utility score are similar:
ρ = −0.10 for past utilisation, and ρ = −0.13 for comorbidity burden.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics – elective sample.
Variable Obs Mean SD ICC
Patient characteristics
Distance travelled (in km) 171,472 14.6 17.4
Distance travelled past closest provider
(in km)
171,472 5.0 14.4
Number of providers within 10 km radius 171,472 1.3 1.5
Number of providers within 30 km radius 171,472 6.7 5.7
Age 171,472 68.0 11.5
Male 171,472 0.40 0.49
Past utilisation 171,472 0.13 0.49
Number of Elixhauser conditions 171,472 0.43 0.94
Income deprivation 171,472 0.12 0.09
Pre-operative Oxford Hip Score 114,187 17.4 8.2
Provider characteristics
Observed volume 568 305.4 209.1 94.7%
Waiting time (proportion waiting
>120 days)
568 0.2 0.2 59.5%
Change in Oxford Hip Score 568 19.8 1.4 57.2%
28-day emergency readmission rate (%) 568 5.67 2.40 36.8%
1-year revision rate (%) 568 0.94 0.82 17.8%
28-day mortality rate (%) 568 0.17 0.36 3.5%
Obs = Observations; SD = Standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass correlation coeﬃ-
cient. Notes: Patient characteristics for patients choosing provider between April 2010
and March 2013. Waiting time and quality metrics are for ﬁnancial years 2009/10
to 2011/12. Provider characteristics are unweighted. The intraclass correlation co-
eﬃcient (ICC) measures the proportion of variation that occurs between providers,
rather than over time.
Fig. 1. Percentage of elective patients who went to their Nth nearest hospital.
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reject the IIA assumption. We therefore concentrate on the MNL
models reported in Tables 2–6.
Table 2 is our baseline speciﬁcation with distance, lagged waiting
time, the four lagged quality metrics, and indicators for the type
of provider as well as interactions with patient age, gender, past utili-
sation, comorbidity, and local area income deprivation (we explore
interactionswith pre-operative OHS in section 4.2.2). Themain effects
are the estimated marginal utilities for the reference patient with
mean or modal characteristics. The reference patient prefers shorter
distances with the marginal disutility from distance declining with
distance. She prefers providers with lower proportions of long-
waits and specialised providers to non-specialised providers. She
is also more likely to choose a public provider over a private pro-
vider after accounting for distance, waiting time and quality.23
Reference patient demand is increasing with the OHS change
score and decreasing with emergency readmission rates. The esti-
mated WTT for a one SD increase in OHS is 0.9 km or 6% of the
average distance travelled to the chosen provider. The WTT for a
SD decrease in emergency readmission rates is 0.6 km. There is no
statistically signiﬁcant effect of procedure-speciﬁc mortality or re-
vision rates on demand.
Using contemporaneous, rather than lagged, waiting time and
quality measures, we ﬁnd that the sign of all coeﬃcients remain
the same, but the coeﬃcients on revision and mortality rates are
now statistically signiﬁcant (Appendix Table A2, model 1), possi-
bly because of endogeneity in the contemporaneous quality
measures.Whenwe use the laggedmedianwaiting time as a waiting
time measure its coeﬃcient is positive but not statistically signif-
icant (Appendix Table A2, model 2) and the other coeﬃcients are
unaffected. This lack of an effect of median waiting time may be ex-
plained by its historically low level, with patients being more
concerned about excessive rather than average waits.24 The HSCIC
also produces hospital quality scores based on the case-mix ad-
justed change in the EQ-5D utility score. This is highly correlated
with the OHS change score (Neuburger et al., 2013) and when we
estimate the baseline speciﬁcation with EQ-5D substituted for OHS
we ﬁnd similar WTT of 0.9 km for a one SD increase in the PROM
measure (Appendix Table A2, model 3). We also test for a non-
linear relationship between marginal utility and PROM quality by
re-estimating the model with indicators for quartile groups of the
OHS change score. We ﬁnd a positive dose–response relationship:
marginal utility increases proportionally between the ﬁrst and second
quartile, and between the second and third quartile, with no further
increase between the third and fourth quartiles (available on request).
Excluding independent sector treatment centres from patient choice
sets (Appendix Table A2, model 4) has little impact, though the co-
eﬃcient on revision rates becomes negative and statistically
signiﬁcant. Finally, results are robust to differing deﬁnitions of choice
sets (i.e. 30 or 100 closest providers) (Appendix Table A3).
Very few healthcare systems collect and report information on
health gains from surgery disaggregated by hospital. It is there-
fore important to understand whether studies of healthcare market
structures that rely solely on traditional measures of quality are likely
to be biased. Results (available on request) from a model without
OHS change scores suggest that this is not the case: there is little
change in the coeﬃcients on the other quality variables. This is
23 During our study period ISTCs were funded through block contracts and paid
to provide care to a pre-speciﬁed number of NHS patients. However, most ISTCs did
not fulﬁl their quotas although they generally had low waiting times (Naylor and
Gregory, 2009). Our results are consistent with this observation and suggest a pos-
itive preference for public providers by NHS-funded hip replacement patients. Brown
et al. 2015 also found evidence of a pro-public preference in the stated prefer-
ences of the general public in New Zealand.
24 The average waiting time at provider level is 2.5 months, compared with around
8 months at the beginning of the century (Siciliani et al., 2014).
Table 2
Estimated marginal utilities.
Variable Est SE
Main effects
Change in Oxford Hip
Score
0.130 0.008***
28-day emergency
readmission rate (%)
−0.053 0.004***
1-year revision rate (%) −0.017 0.010
28-day mortality rate (%) −0.038 0.028
Distance (in km) −0.270 0.007***
Distance2 0.002 0.000***
Distance3 −0.00001 0.000***
NHS trust – medium −0.572 0.031***
NHS trust – multi-service −0.663 0.096***
NHS trust – small −0.832 0.039***
NHS trust – specialist 1.016 0.075***
NHS trust – teaching −0.444 0.034***
Independent sector
treatment centre
−1.564 0.039***
Primary care trust −1.256 0.206***
Waiting time (proportion
waiting >120 days)
−0.157 0.077*
Interaction with distance
× Patient age −0.002 0.000***
× Male 0.015 0.012
× Past utilisation −0.018 0.005***
× Comorbidity count 0.0002 0.001
× Income deprivation −0.261 0.046***
Interaction with waiting time
× Patient age 0.008 0.003**
× Male −0.076 0.055
× Past utilisation 0.022 0.063
× Comorbidity count −0.046 0.033
× Income deprivation 1.126 0.469*
Interaction with change in Oxford Hip Score
× Patient age 0.001 0.000*
× Male −0.007 0.006
× Past utilisation −0.007 0.007
× Comorbidity count −0.008 0.003*
× Income deprivation −0.420 0.050***
Interaction with 28-day emergency readmission rate
× Patient age −0.0004 0.000*
× Male −0.001 0.004
× Past utilisation 0.012 0.004**
× Comorbidity count 0.001 0.002
× Income deprivation 0.122 0.027***
Interaction with 1-year revision rate
× Patient age 0.001 0.000
× Male 0.012 0.009
× Past utilisation −0.002 0.011
× Comorbidity count 0.000 0.005
× Income deprivation −0.045 0.068
Interaction with 28-day mortality rate
× Patient age −0.001 0.001
× Male −0.058 0.023*
× Past utilisation 0.046 0.028
× Comorbidity count −0.008 0.016
× Income deprivation −0.111 0.179
WTT (OHS change) 0.899 0.056***
WTT (Readmission rate) −0.625 0.050***
WTT (Revision rate) −0.067 0.041
WTT (Mortality rate) −0.068 0.049
Number of patients 170,916
Number of providers 228
BIC 442,722
Pseudo R2 0.659
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement pa-
tients treated between April 2010 andMarch 2013. Waiting time and quality metrics
are lagged by one year. Coeﬃcients are marginal utilities. Interactions of patient char-
acteristics with distance2, distance3 and provider type are not reported (available
on request). WTT (OHS) is the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the
marginal utility of distance β β βd d d+ +( )2 32 32 evaluated at the average distance to the
chosen provider.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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consistent with the low observed correlation between PROM change
scores and the other quality metrics and suggests that the former
pick up an additional different dimension of hospital quality that
is valued by patients.
4.2.2. Patient heterogeneity
The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms in Table 2 suggest that
preferences vary across types of patient. We ﬁnd, like other studies
(Beckert et al., 2012; Propper et al., 2007), that older patients dislike
distance more. They care less about waiting time and get greater
marginal utility from improvements in the OHS change score and
reductions in emergency readmissions. There is little difference
between the preferences of male and female patients except that
male patients have a greater dislike for providers with higher mor-
tality. Preferences vary little by morbidity as measured by past
emergency admissions or comorbidity count, except that more
morbid patients have a greater dislike of distance and care less about
OHS change rates. Finally, patients from neighbourhoodswith greater
income deprivation care more about distance and less about quality,
although the estimated marginal utility of PROM quality is posi-
tive for all but the 1644 most deprived patients (≤1% of sample).
We use the detailed patient reported pre-operative OHS mea-
sures in our dataset to explore in more detail how patients in worse
health status differ from their healthier counterparts in their sen-
sitive to quality and willingness to travel for higher quality, as
commonly assumed in the literature on hospital quality (Geweke
et al., 2003; Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999). Sicker patients may
have greater marginal disutility from distance but greater margin-
al utility from quality, so that they may be more or less willing to
travel to a provider than health patients. The correlations between
patients’ pre-operative OHS and the routinely available morbidity
measures are low, suggesting that they measure different aspects
of the patient’s condition at the time of admission.
The ﬁrst model in Table 3 is the same as our baseline speciﬁca-
tion but with additional patient pre-operative OHS interactions.
Interaction terms with other patient characteristics are omitted and
available from the authors. We ﬁnd that healthier patients are more
willing to travel. Although the marginal utility from higher quality
is unaffected by pre-operative OHS, healthier patients have a smaller
disutility from distance and so are more willing to travel for higher
quality.25 Healthier patients are also more likely to choose a private
provider, which is consistent with observed differences in patient
mix across provider types (Browne et al., 2008).
The fact that pre-operativeOHSdata are available for only about 60%
of patients raises concerns about response bias if unobserved factors
affect propensity to respond and utility from providers.26 To investi-
gate if responders to the pre-operative PROM questionnaire have
different preferences to non-responders we re-estimate the baseline
speciﬁcation of Table 2 for our full sample (responders and non-
responders) but interact a dummy variable for responder status with
all themain and interacted explanatory variables; pre-operative health
status is notmodelled. However, because the pre-operative PROMques-
tionnaire is administered after the patient has chosen the provider, it
is unclearwhether an observed response indicates differences in patient
preferences orwhether the choice determines the likelihood to observe
a response. For example, private providers have higher response rates
thanNHShospitals (Gomes et al., 2015; Gutacker et al., 2015b) and also
tend to have higher observed quality and shorter waiting times. We
address this concern by including the observed provider pre-operative
response rate as a provider characteristic whenmodelling the choices
of responders and non-responders. This variable is informative about
the individual’s propensity to ﬁll in a pre-operative PROM question-
naire given the chosen provider27.
In model 2 in Table 2 we add the provider response rate to the re-
sponder onlymodel. Its coeﬃcient is positive, which is to be expected
since patients responding to the pre-operative questionnaire aremore
likely to have been treated at a provider with a higher response rate.
Two effects areworth noting. The inclusion of the response rate reduces
WTT for an increase in the OHS change score by about 8% relative to
model 1, suggesting that providers’ ability to administer the pre-
operative questionnaire may be correlated with desirable, but
unobserved, provider characteristics. More importantly, the esti-
matedWTTswith orwithout adjusting (Table2) for pre-operativehealth
differ in a magnitude of only 100 metres. This suggests that the esti-
mates from our baseline speciﬁcation without adjustment for pre-
operative health are robust to potential response bias.
Model 3 in Table 2 shows that responders and non-responders
have generally similar revealed preferences, with the exception of
preferences for waiting times (non-responders prefer lower pro-
portions of long-waits), distance (non-responders are less willing
to travel), revision rates (non-responders dislike providers with
higher rates, whereas responders do not) and PROM quality (non-
responders derive less utility from health gains and are thus less
willing to travel for it). There is no difference with respect to the
disutility from readmission rates or mortality.
4.3. Testing for unobserved provider characteristics
We also explore the possible impact of omitted hospital character-
istics on our estimates of marginal utility for quality and other hospital
characteristics.We ﬁrst compare preferences of elective and emergen-
cy patients estimated from pooled choice models with a full set of
emergency patient dummy variables interacted with all explanatory
variables (see Section 3.2 for the detailed rationale). There are 73,496
emergency patients in our sample. Only 19.5% of emergency patients
bypassed the nearest provider (see Appendix Fig. A1). Descriptive sta-
tistics for this patient group are reported in Appendix Table A4.
Emergencypatients’ choice sets are the 50 closest providerswho carried
out hip replacement surgery on at least 30 emergency patients in the
current and previous year. This rules out private and specialised pro-
viders who only treat elective hip replacement patients. 694 (0.9%)
emergency patients were dropped because they attended a provider
not in their choice set. All main effects are for patients with mean or
modal elective patient characteristics.
We report results for two different speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst model
in Table 4 compares emergency patients with elective patients who
choose NHS or independent providers (same as Table 2). However,
there are some marked differences in observed characteristics
between those two groups. For example, emergency patients are
on average 12 years older than elective patients and have over twice
as many recorded comorbidities. Hence in the second model re-
ported in Table 5 we compare a set of elective and emergency
25 In additional analyses we explored whether patients’ past experience of care
quality as measured by their individual change in OHS predicts their future will-
ingness to return to the same provider for planned hip replacement of their other
hip joint. We use data on 3195 patients that were treated in 2010/11, had pre- and
post-operative OHS recorded and received a second primary hip replacement before
the end of our dataset (31 March 2013). Of these, 2923 (91.4%) attended their initial
provider for further surgery. Estimates from logit regression models show no asso-
ciation between the probability to re-attend and the experienced change in OHS from
the initial surgery.
26 We are not concerned about the implications of response rates for the hospital
level case-mix adjusted OHS change scores as these have been shown to be robust
to variations in response rate (Gomes et al., 2015).
27 As a check, we ﬁrst re-estimate the responder only model with the addition of
provider pre-operative response rates but without interactions with pre-operative
health. The results are robust to this sensitivity analysis, with the WTT of 0.9 km
(SE = 0.056) for a standard deviation increase in PROM quality being similar to our
baseline speciﬁcation (full results available on request).
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patients matched exactly on age, gender, past emergency admis-
sions, number of comorbidities, income deprivation and year of
treatment. Additionally, we restrict the elective patient sample to
those who used an NHS provider that treated at least 30 elective
and emergency patients in that year, so that the choice sets are iden-
tical for elective and emergency conditional on location.
Both models suggest that OHS change scores have less inﬂu-
ence on the provider used by emergency patients than for elective
patient. The provider used by emergency patients is also less af-
fected by more traditional readmission and mortality rates, though
differences are statistically insigniﬁcant and less precisely esti-
mated. In the second speciﬁcation in Table 5, with closely matched
patients, the estimated marginal utility of OHS changes
( βqEmer = 0 058. ) is just over one half of that for elective patients
( βqElec = 0 110. ) and signiﬁcant at p < 0.05. If we assume that emer-
gency patients’ demand is entirely inelastic to variation in observed
elective quality and that the estimated association for emergency
patients is a result of omitted variables that affect emergency and
elective patients in the same way, then the difference in the mar-
ginal utility of OHS changes ( βqΔ = 0 052. ) can be interpreted as a
lower bound estimate of the true effect of OHS change score on elec-
tive patient utility. The WTT for a one SD increase in OHS change
scores then is 0.3 km (SE = 0.103), which is substantially smaller than
the 0.9 km estimated in our main speciﬁcation (see Table 2).28
28 Emergency patients are, on average, less willing to travel than elective pa-
tients. This is reﬂected by a more negative coeﬃcient on the cubic distance term in
Tables 4 and 5 so that utility decreases more rapidly as distance increases. Further-
more, emergency patients tend to be older than elective patients and age is associated
with increased disutility from travel. This emphasises the need to compare WTTs
for a deﬁned reference patient, not at sample averages.
Table 3
Choice models allowing for patient pre-operative Oxford Hip Score.
Variable Patients with pre-op
OHS (1)
Patients with pre-op
OHS (2)
All patients (3)
Responders
(3a)
Non-responders
(3b)
Difference
(3c)
Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
Main effects
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.153 0.009*** 0.141 0.009*** 0.139 0.009*** 0.113 0.009*** 0.026 0.009**
28-day emergency readmission rate (%) −0.058 0.005*** −0.051 0.005*** −0.051 0.005*** −0.048 0.006*** −0.003 0.005
1-year revision rate (%) −0.028 0.011* −0.002 0.011 −0.003 0.011 −0.036 0.014** 0.032 0.013*
28-day mortality rate (%) −0.137 0.033*** −0.052 0.030 −0.052 0.030 −0.021 0.034 −0.031 0.033
Distance (in km) −0.265 0.008*** −0.264 0.008*** −0.265 0.009*** −0.281 0.006*** 0.017 0.008*
Distance2 0.002 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.003 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
Distance3 −0.00001 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
NHS trust – medium −0.517 0.035*** −0.591 0.034*** −0.583 0.034*** −0.565 0.036*** −0.018 0.031
NHS trust – multi-service −0.948 0.125*** −0.961 0.124*** −0.951 0.123*** −0.625 0.107*** −0.325 0.126**
NHS trust – small −0.799 0.043*** −0.854 0.043*** −0.849 0.042*** −0.885 0.046*** 0.036 0.039
NHS trust – specialist 1.184 0.074*** 0.961 0.076*** 0.954 0.076*** 0.979 0.100*** −0.025 0.068
NHS trust – teaching −0.383 0.037*** −0.425 0.037*** −0.414 0.037*** −0.539 0.039*** 0.125 0.034***
Independent sector treatment centre −1.520 0.043*** −1.548 0.042*** −1.556 0.042*** −1.698 0.046*** 0.141 0.042***
Primary care trust −1.031 0.219*** −1.404 0.221*** −1.400 0.221*** −1.263 0.254*** −0.137 0.251
Waiting time (proportion waiting
>120 days)
−0.343 0.088*** −0.026 0.086 −0.024 0.085 −0.399 0.092*** 0.375 0.088***
Response rate (%) 0.019 0.001*** 0.019 0.001*** −0.027 0.001*** 0.046 0.001***
Interaction with pre-operative Oxford Hip Score
× Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
× 28-day emergency readmission rate (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
× 1-year revision rate (%) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
× 28-day mortality rate (%) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
× Distance (in km) 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000***
× Distance2 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000**
× Distance3 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000**
× NHS trust – medium −0.002 0.002 −0.004 0.002*
× NHS trust – multi-service −0.007 0.007 −0.008 0.007
× NHS trust – small −0.002 0.002 −0.003 0.002
× NHS trust – specialist 0.014 0.003*** 0.011 0.003***
× NHS trust – teaching −0.007 0.002*** −0.008 0.002***
× Independent sector treatment centre 0.029 0.002*** 0.027 0.002***
× Primary care trust 0.000 0.008 −0.004 0.008
× Waiting time (proportion waiting
>120 days)
−0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005
× Response rate (%) 0.000 0.000***
WTT (OHS change) 1.075 0.062*** 0.991 0.064*** 0.974 0.063*** 0.756 0.064*** 0.218 0.062***
WTT (Readmission rate) −0.689 0.057*** −0.612 0.056*** −0.604 0.056*** −0.544 0.063*** −0.060 0.060
WTT (Revision rate) −0.116 0.046* −0.006 0.045 −0.013 0.045 −0.139 0.053** 0.126 0.051*
WTT (Mortality rate) −0.243 0.060*** −0.092 0.054 −0.093 0.054 −0.036 0.058 −0.057 0.057
Number of patients 113,846 113,846 170,916
Number of providers 228 228 228
BIC 296,526 292,634 432,899
Pseudo R2 0.658 0.662 0.667
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2012. Waiting time and quality metrics are
lagged by one year. Coeﬃcients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the average
distance to the chosen provider. Models in (1) and (2) are for patients reporting a pre-operation OHS. Model in (3) is for all patients and interacts a dummy variable for
reporting a pre-operation OHS. Interaction effects are reported in (3c). All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities,
and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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Our second sensitivity check for possible bias due to unob-
served hospital characteristics is to estimate our baseline speciﬁcation
(1) for elective patients with the addition of hospital ﬁxed effects.
In Table 6 in the model estimated with choice sets including ISTCs,
PROM quality still has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on demand,
whereas emergency readmission rates no longer do. The WTT to
travel for PROM quality is however nearly 90% lower than that cal-
culated from the results in Table 2 (0.1 km vs 0.9 km). Also, mortality
Table 4
Comparison of marginal utilities for elective and emergency patients.
Variable Elective patients Emergency patients Difference
Est SE Est SE Est SE
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.130 0.008*** 0.071 0.015*** 0.058 0.014***
28-day emergency readmission rate (%) −0.053 0.004*** −0.043 0.008*** −0.010 0.008
1-year revision rate (%) −0.017 0.010 −0.063 0.022** 0.046 0.021*
28-day mortality rate (%) −0.038 0.028 −0.011 0.057 −0.027 0.059
Distance (in km) −0.270 0.007*** −0.324 0.011*** 0.054 0.013***
Distance2 0.002 0.000*** 0.003 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
Distance3 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
NHS trust – medium −0.572 0.031*** −0.660 0.051*** 0.088 0.045*
NHS trust – multi-service −0.663 0.096*** −1.021 0.167*** 0.358 0.150*
NHS trust – small −0.832 0.039*** −0.872 0.053*** 0.040 0.048
NHS trust – specialist 1.016 0.075*** n/a n/a
NHS trust – teaching −0.444 0.034*** −0.641 0.050*** 0.197 0.047***
Independent sector treatment centre −1.564 0.039*** n/a n/a
Primary care trust −1.256 0.206*** −1.353 0.275*** 0.097 0.183
Waiting time (proportion waiting >120 days) −0.157 0.077* −0.054 0.114 −0.103 0.107
WTT (OHS change) 0.899 0.056*** 0.398 0.085*** 0.501 0.076***
WTT (Readmission rate) −0.625 0.050*** −0.405 0.080*** −0.219 0.075**
WTT (Revision rate) −0.067 0.041 −0.203 0.072** 0.137 0.068*
WTT (Mortality rate) −0.068 0.049 −0.016 0.081 −0.052 0.086
Number of patients 170,916 72,802
Number of providers 228 137
BIC 542,130
Pseudo R2 0.709
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective and emergency hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013. Waiting time and
quality metrics are lagged by one year. Coeﬃcients are marginal utilities for the ‘reference patient’. Elective and emergency patients are not matched on observed charac-
teristics but the ‘reference patient’ in both patient populations is deﬁned according to the average characteristics of the elective patient sample. WTT is the ratio of the
coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model is estimated with a full set of dummy variables in-
teracted with hospital characteristics and other interaction terms. All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities,
and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Table 5
Comparison of marginal utilities for elective and emergency patients – matched sample.
Variable Elective patients Emergency patients Difference
Est SE Est SE Est SE
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.110 0.017*** 0.058 0.016*** 0.052 0.018**
28-day emergency readmission rate (%) −0.060 0.010*** −0.041 0.009*** −0.019 0.011
1-year revision rate (%) −0.099 0.025*** −0.078 0.025** −0.021 0.030
28-day mortality rate (%) −0.035 0.067 0.006 0.066 −0.041 0.087
Distance (in km) −0.379 0.010*** −0.324 0.015*** −0.055 0.017**
Distance2 0.005 0.000*** 0.003 0.000*** 0.002 0.000***
Distance3 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust – medium −0.817 0.054*** −0.642 0.055*** −0.176 0.061**
NHS trust – multi-service −0.784 0.174*** −1.027 0.189*** 0.242 0.220
NHS trust – small −0.958 0.063*** −0.834 0.059*** −0.123 0.071
NHS trust – teaching −0.489 0.058*** −0.622 0.054*** 0.133 0.066*
Primary care trust −1.419 0.324*** −1.509 0.366*** 0.090 0.353
Waiting time (proportion waiting >120 days) −0.546 0.137*** −0.200 0.131 −0.347 0.162*
WTT (OHS change) 0.617 0.094*** 0.324 0.091*** −0.292 0.103**
WTT (Readmission rate) −0.573 0.091*** −0.389 0.087*** 0.184 0.106
WTT (Revision rate) −0.323 0.081*** −0.254 0.082** 0.069 0.099
WTT (Mortality rate) −0.049 0.095 0.008 0.094 0.058 0.123
Number of patients 31,631 31,631
Number of providers 137 137
BIC 97,740
Pseudo R2 0.794
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective and emergency hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013. Waiting time and
quality metrics are lagged by one year. Coeﬃcients are marginal utilities for the ‘reference patient’. Elective and emergency patients are matched exactly on observed char-
acteristics (age, gender, past emergency utilisation in last year (none, once, or more), income deprivation of neighbourhood, number of Elixhauser comorbit conditions,
year of treatment) and the ‘reference patient’ in both patient populations is deﬁned according to the average (prior to matching) characteristics of the elective patient sample.
Choice sets include only providers that treat at least 30 elective and 30 emergency hip replacement patient in this period. WTT is the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the quality
variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model is estimated with a full set of dummy variables interacted with hospital char-
acteristics and other interaction terms. All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital
characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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rates are now statistically signiﬁcantly positively associated with
demand. This may be the result of market entry of low-mortality
ISTCs towards the end of our study period. Results are broadly similar
when patients’ choice sets are restricted to NHS hospitals, al-
though we now ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates
on all variables but distance. This is likely to be due to the limited
within-provider variation over time in quality metrics and the ﬁxed
effects absorbing part of the effect of time-invariant quality on choice.
4.4. Public reporting
The public release of hospital quality information was intend-
ed to improve patients’ knowledge about hospital quality and, thus,
alter demand patterns. But patients and their GPs may already have
had expectations about hospital quality (e.g. from the experience
of other patients in the area) so that the new data may simply
measure what was already known to them (Dranove and Sfekas,
2008). We investigate this by exploiting a feature of the data col-
lection process.29 Information on patients’ OHS was collected from
April 2009 onwards but hospital PROM scores were not reported
in the public domain until early 2010 due to the lag in post-
operative data collection. Hence, choices of patients treated in the
ﬁnancial year 2009/10 (i.e. prior to our sample) could not have been
inﬂuenced by the public release of OHS change scores for 2009/10.
We estimate a conditional logit model for patients in 2009/10
and 2010/11 in which we assume that patient utility i from hos-
pital j in year t is:
U D D D Q OHSijt ij d i ij d i ij d i jt q i j= ′ + + + +
′ ′
−
β β β β, , , , ,*2 3 1 2009 12 3 ′ 0
2010 11 2009 10 1
′
+ ′ + ′ + ′ +
= −
β
λ β β
OHS i
t j OHS i jt w i jt z iI OHS W Z
,
, , , , νijt (10)
This is the same as our model in (1) except that we assume that
patients in 2009/10 choose as if they knew the OHS change scores
for 2009/10 and patients in 2010/11 choose knowing the OHS change
scores for 2009/10. Q jt−1* denotes the other lagged quality vari-
ables (i.e. emergency readmission rates, mortality rates, revision
rates) that were available to both patient groups.
We ﬁnd that βOHS = 0.057 (SE = 0.028) and λOHS = −0.009
(SE = 0.008). This suggests that patients in 2009/10 acted as if they
knew the as yet unpublished OHS quality scores and that their choice
behaviour was the same as that of patients choosing in 2010/11
when the OHS quality scores were published. Hence, the hospi-
tals’ OHS change scores may capture an aspect of quality which was
known and valued by patients, and the publication of PROMs in the
public domain does not seem to have altered this relation in the
year of its introduction or subsequent years.
4.5. Responsiveness to auxiliary quality information
An alternative way to explore whether patients have an under-
standing and therefore respond to hospital quality is to test whether
hospital choice is inﬂuenced by other publicly available quality
metrics which are unlikely to be consulted as part of the choice
process. Hip and knee replacements are typically performed by the
same surgeons using common production inputs (e.g. same oper-
ation rooms, nursing input, diagnostic services, etc.). Hence, knee
replacement-speciﬁc quality metrics may be informative about the
quality of orthopaedic care provided since the correlation coeﬃ-
cient between the OHS and OKS change scores is 0.434.
We have re-estimated our main speciﬁcation and included the
change in Oxford Knee Score (OKS) as an additional regressor. Our
sample is reduced to 169,391 hip replacement patients (550
provider-year observations) since not all providers have OKS change
scores recorded and/or treat knee replacement patients. We ﬁnd a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on lagged OKS change
scores of 0.121 (SE = 0.008). The coeﬃcient on lagged OHS is slightly
reduced to 0.088 (SE = 0.008), presumably due to the correlation
between both metrics and the coeﬃcient on lagged OKS picking up
some of what was previously picked up by the OHS coeﬃcient. All
other coeﬃcients are similar.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on knee replacement quality in ex-
plaining choice of hip replacement provider could be because both
knee replacement quality and hip replacement quality measures
convey information to patients and their GP advisors about the
quality of care they are likely to experience in the provider’s or-
thopaedic department. Or, if we believe it is implausible that patients
access information about knee replacement quality when choos-
ing a hip replacement provider, we can interpret the coeﬃcient as
revealing to the econometrician that there are aspects of quality ob-
servable by patients, over and above those revealed in published
quality metrics, which are correlated with knee replacement quality.
In either case, the ﬁnding provides additional support for believ-
ing that patient choice of provider is inﬂuenced by quality.
5. The economic effects of quality on demand
We use the results from choice models to illustrate the effect of
quality differentiation on hospital demand. Columns four and ﬁve
of Table 7 provide the marginal utilities and the willingness to travel
29 Chernew et al. (2008) and Dafny and Dranove (2008) both adopt a different ap-
proach and estimate Bayesian learning models to gauge patients’ prior knowledge
of health insurance quality and subsequent changes when report cards were
released.
Table 6
Choice model controlling for unobserved time-invariant hospital effects.
All providers (1) NHS providers
only (2)
Est SE Est SE
Change in Oxford
Hip Score
0.017 0.006** 0.014 0.007
28-day emergency
readmission rate (%)
0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004
1-year revision rate (%) 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.012
28-day mortality rate (%) 0.045 0.022* 0.028 0.028
Distance (in km) −0.293 0.007*** −0.334 0.010***
Distance2 0.003 0.000*** 0.003 0.000***
Distance3 −0.00001 0.000*** −0.00001 0.000***
Waiting time
(proportion waiting
>120 days)
0.013 0.061 0.045 0.066
WTT (OHS change) 0.108 0.041** 0.077 0.042
WTT (Readmission rate) 0.050 0.037 0.014 0.040
WTT (Revision rate) 0.013 0.036 0.005 0.039
WTT (Mortality rate) 0.072 0.035* 0.040 0.040
Number of patients 170,916 146,839
Number of providers 228 144
BIC 394,881 246,842
Pseudo R2 0.698 0.762
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement pa-
tients treated between April 2010 andMarch 2013. Waiting time and quality metrics
are lagged by one year. Coeﬃcients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the
coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at
the average distance to the chosen provider. Model in (1) does not impose restric-
tions on the type of provider in patients’ choice sets. Model in (2) is based on a
restricted choice set of NHS providers, thereby excluding patients that selected ISTCs.
All models include indicator variables for hospitals (not reported). All models also
contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser
comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not re-
ported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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for one SD improvement in the quality measures. The sixth and
seventh columns show the average total and relative change in
demand from a one SD improvement in quality, and column eight
gives the own quality demand elasticities. Quality improvements
on the three failure measures correspond to decreases in rates. We
provide calculations based on the baseline speciﬁcation in Table 2,
the hospital ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation in Table 6, and the speciﬁ-
cation comparing elective and emergency patients in Table 4. We
focus our discussion on the latter since, under the assumption that
elective and emergency patients have the same preferences over
unobserved hospital characteristics, it accounts for unobservable hos-
pital effects but is more precisely estimated than the ﬁxed effects
model. The marginal utilities used in these calculations are the es-
timated differences between elective and emergency patients.
The expected increase in demand for a one SD increase in OHS
is 16 patients, or 4.4% of predicted demand at current quality levels.
Decreases in mortality and emergency admission rates are associ-
ated with increases in demand, although the associations of these
qualitymetrics with demand are not statistically signiﬁcant. Themar-
ginal utility of quality as measured through revision rates is negative
for both elective and emergency patients but more so for the latter
so that quality improvements are associated with a negative effect
on demand (see Section 3.2). The effect of a one SD increase in OHS
is larger than that of a one SD decrease in readmission rate.
There is substantial variation across providers in the effect of OHS
change scores on own demand (Fig. 2). The number of additional
patients arising from a one SD increase in OHS ranges from 3 to 56
(mean = 15.9). The relative volume increase from a one SD in-
crease in OHS ranges from 1% to 8% (mean = 4.4%). The estimated
elasticities range from 0.1 to 1.2 (mean = 0.6). About 42% of the vari-
ation in elasticities is explained by the amount of competition a
provider faces, here measured by the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index
(HHI).30 Providers in more competitive areas (low HHI) face larger
30 The HHI for provider j is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of
all providers j J* *= 1, ,… that service LSOA a = 1,…,A, here denoted as saj , weighted
by the proportion of the provider’s observed total activity originating from this LSOA,
sja , so that:
HHI s sj ja
a
aj
j
= ∗ ( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥∑ ∑ **
2
(11)
Hospital catchment areas are deﬁned as all LSOAswithin a radius of 30 km around
the hospital.
Table 7
Effect sizes of hospital quality measures.
Quality indicator Observed Marginal utility Effect of SD improvement in quality Elasticity of demand
Mean SD WTT Demand change % Demand change
Baseline speciﬁcation
Change in Oxford Hip Score 19.8 1.4 0.130 0.9 35.3 9.8 1.4
Emergency readmission rate (in %) 5.7 2.4 0.053 0.6 24.5 6.8 0.2
Revision rate (in %) 0.9 0.8 0.017 0.1 2.6 0.7 0.01
Mortality rate (in %) 0.2 0.4 0.038 0.1 2.7 0.7 0.004
Time-invariant hospital ﬁxed effects
Change in Oxford Hip Score 19.8 1.4 0.017 0.1 4.6 1.2 0.02
Emergency readmission rate (in %) 5.7 2.4 0.005 −0.1 −2.1 −0.6 −0.01
Revision rate (in %) 0.9 0.8 0.003 −0.01 −0.5 −0.1 −0.002
Mortality rate (in %) 0.2 0.4 0.045 −0.1 −3.1 −0.8 −0.004
Elective vs emergency comparison
Change in Oxford Hip Score 19.8 1.4 0.058 0.5 15.9 4.4 0.6
Emergency readmission rate (in %) 5.7 2.4 −0.010 0.2 4.8 1.3 0.03
Revision rate (in %) 0.9 0.8 0.046 −0.1 −7.3 −2.0 −0.02
Mortality rate (in %) 0.2 0.4 −0.027 0.1 1.9 0.5 0.003
SD = Standard deviation; MU = Marginal utility; WTT = Willingness to travel.
Notes: WTT is the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the average distance to the chosen provider. Changes in
volume and elasticities are averaged across hospital-year observations and are weighted by predicted demand ˆY Pijt i M ijtit= ∑ ∈ . The WTT, effects of a SD improvement and elas-
ticities for the three failure measures are expressed so that they reﬂect decreases in rates.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of changes in hospital demand as a result of a SD increase in Oxford Hip Score change scores and quality elasticity of demand.
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quality elasticities than those in less competitive areas (high HHI),
with elasticities falling by approximately 0.14 per 0.1 increase in HHI
(assuming a linear effect; p < 0.001) (Fig. 3). Markets are more com-
petitive in areas where independent sector treatment centres are
active. However, this result should be interpreted cautiously since
the functional form of the choice model does not allow patients’
preferences for quality to vary by provider type.
We also examine the effect of changes in the quality of other pro-
viders on a provider’s demand. Higher cross-quality demand
elasticitiesmake it more likely that increases in one provider’s quality
will trigger an increase in the quality of other providers. Fig. 4 shows
how cross-quality elasticities decline rapidly as the distances between
providers increase. Whereas a 1% increase in a competitor’s PROM
quality is associated with a −0.32% reduction in demand if the com-
petitor is located within 10 km, this falls to −0.11% when the
competitor is 30 km away. Hence, quality competition is likely to
be restricted geographically.
6. Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper is the ﬁrst to test whether patient choice of hospital
is inﬂuenced by hospital quality as measured by the change in health
status and functioning rather than by traditional failure measures
such as readmission and mortality rates. We use data on observed
choices for all NHS-funded hip replacement patients treated between
April 2010 andMarch 2013 in public and private hospitals in England.
The average health gain, as measured by the PROMs-based OHS
change score, is only weakly correlated with the simple condition-
speciﬁc mortality, revision and emergency readmission rates across
hospitals. This suggests that choice models which do not include
PROMs-basedmeasuresmaymiss important factors affecting patient
choice of hospital. This is borne out by the results from our choice
models. We ﬁnd that elective hospital demand responds to ob-
served quality as measured by PROMs after conditioning on patient
characteristics, distance to hospital and other quality metrics. Hos-
pital demand is relatively more responsive to OHS change quality
than emergency readmission rates. There is no statistically signif-
icant association of choice of provider with mortality, though this
may be because the mortality risk for an elective hip replacement
is very small, nor was there an association with revision rates after
primary hip replacement surgery. Finally, we found that patients
may respond to hospital quality even when corresponding infor-
mation is not made publicly available, yet.
Our results are relevant for policy. First, they show that provid-
ers can attract additional patients by raising quality, which is a
necessary condition for competition to improve quality. Second, we
ﬁnd that demand is more responsive to quality measures based on
the change in patient health status due to treatment, rather than
to crude measures such as rates of mortality or emergency read-
mission. Thus hospitals wishing to attract patients can do so by
improving aspects of quality with a more immediate link to out-
comes experienced by all patients. Third, the public release of
information on hospital quality may not in itself trigger a change
in demand if patients have other channels by which they can infer
hospital quality. Fourth, our results emphasise the importance of
market structure in determining incentives for competing on quality:
the effect of quality changes on the providers’ ability to attract pa-
tients away from rival hospitals decreases rapidly with distance. Thus
some providers with few nearby rivals face little incentive to raise
quality. This is likely to be true of all types of competition, since
the number of rivals is likely to be in part determined by the number
of potential patients, but is not always acknowledged in the health
policy debate about stimulating quality improvement efforts through
increased competition. Of course, whether or not providers engage
in quality competition based on published quality information
depends on whether they perceive their demand to be elastic to
quality changes and on how much they value their reputation. We
cannot answer these questions with our data. Finally, our esti-
mated effect may, at least in part, be driven by unobserved hospital
characteristics correlated with observable quality. We attempted to
allow for this. Using emergency hip replacement patients as a control
group who should not be affected by elective quality suggests that
the willingness to travel for higher PROM quality could be up to 50%
smaller. A model including hospital ﬁxed effects suggested that will-
ingness to travel could as much as 90% smaller. These alternative
models either rely on strong assumptions or are poorly identiﬁed
because quality scores did not vary much over time. Nevertheless,
they suggest that the 10% increase in demand for a one standard
deviation increase in PROM quality implied by our baseline model
is likely to be an upper bound estimate.
We also explore whether patient preferences vary according to
observed and unobserved patient characteristics. We ﬁnd that the
preference for PROM quality increases with age and decreases with
income deprivation and comorbidity burden. Qualitatively similar
Fig. 3. Differences in quality elasticity of demand between providers in competi-
tive (low HHI) and non-competitive (high HHI) markets. Notes: Solid line shows best
linear ﬁt (Intercept = 1.80 (SE = 0.08), slope = −1.42 (SE = 0.10), R2 = 0.42). Dashed line
shows LOWESS curve.
Fig. 4. Percentage change in demand as a result of percentage change in compet-
itor’s quality. Notes: Dashed line shows LOWESS curve.
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results are obtained for preferences for quality as approximated by
emergency readmission rates. We ﬁnd that patient reported pre-
operative Oxford Hip Score is only weakly correlated at patient level
with other measures of pre-operative morbidity, such as recorded
morbidities or number of previous admissions, which can be ex-
tracted from routine hospital records and are commonly used in the
literature. We do not ﬁnd evidence that preferences for quality vary
with pre-operative health status as reported by the patient herself.
But because healthier patients derive less disutility from travel, they
have, ceteris paribus, a higher willingness to travel for quality. This
ﬁnding may help shed light on the underlying mechanism of the
‘distance bias’ that has been described in other studies of hospital
demand (Geweke et al., 2003; Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999).
There remains scope for further research. First, we cannot tell
whether the estimated effect of quality is driven by patients’ choices
or choices by their GPs or by bargaining betweenpatients and their GPs.
Who is taking the decision has implications for the design of policies
intended to inﬂuence choice of provider. Second, we did not investi-
gatewhether patients undergoing knee replacement, groin hernia repair
or varicose vein surgery, for which PROMs-based qualitymeasures are
also available, are responsive to quality. These patients differ from hip
replacement patients. For example, knee replacement patients are gen-
erally younger and, possibly,morewilling and able to search for hospital
quality information online. Future work could explore difference in
demand patterns across treatments. Third, our ﬁndings may be spe-
ciﬁc to the condition under study. Patients undergoing surgery with
considerable risk of mortality may be more sensitive to quality infor-
mation since the health costs of choosing an inferior provider would
likely bemore signiﬁcant. For exampleGaynor et al. (2012) study choices
made by coronary bypass surgery patients and ﬁnd that they are sen-
sitive to procedure-speciﬁc hospital mortality rates. Hence, the choice
contextmay affect both the general sensitivity to hospital quality aswell
as the importance of individual failure measures such as emergency
readmission or death; both of which are rare after hip replacement.
Fourth, there may be scope for quasi-experimental studies using hos-
pitals that undertook quality improvement plans and comparing them
with hospitals that did not. Any changes in quality scores observed in
the former group but not the latter are likely to reﬂect genuine im-
provements, not statistical noise, and would allow a more precise
estimation of the effect of quality on demand. Fifth, the role of other
qualitymeasures, such as reputation or overall patient experience and
satisfaction, could be explored when they become available.31
In conclusion, our results suggest that patients’ choice of hos-
pital is inﬂuenced by the health gain from treatment, not just by
the likelihood of extreme, rare events such as death or an emer-
gency readmission.
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Appendix
31 In 2013 the NHS launched a “Friends and Family Test” asking patients whether
they would recommend their hospital to friends or family.
Fig. A1. Percentage of emergency patients who went to their Nth nearest hospital.
Table A1
Mixed logit choice model.
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Est SE Est SE
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.130 0.008*** −0.001 0.001
28-day emergency
readmission rate (%)
−0.053 0.004*** −0.001 0.001
1-year revision rate (%) −0.017 0.010 −0.001 0.001
28-day mortality rate (%) −0.039 0.028 −0.019 0.069
Distance (in km) −0.270 0.007***
Distance2 0.002 0.000***
Distance3 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust – medium −0.572 0.031***
NHS trust – multi-service −0.663 0.096***
NHS trust – small −0.832 0.039***
NHS trust – specialist 1.016 0.075***
NHS trust – teaching −0.444 0.034***
Independent sector
treatment centre
−1.564 0.039***
Primary care trust −1.256 0.206***
Waiting time (proportion
waiting >120 days)
−0.157 0.077*
WTT (OHS change) 0.899 0.056***
WTT (Readmission rate) −0.625 0.050***
WTT (Revision rate) −0.067 0.041
WTT (Mortality rate) −0.068 0.048
Number of patients 170,916
Number of providers 228
BIC 442,785
Notes: Random coeﬃcient (mixed) multinomial logit model of choice of hospital for
elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 andMarch 2013.Waiting
time and quality metrics are lagged by one year. Coeﬃcients are marginal utilities.
Random coeﬃcients are speciﬁed for OHS change, readmission rate, revision rate
and mortality rate. WTT is the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the
marginal utility of distance evaluated at the average distance to the chosen hospi-
tal (in km). Interaction terms with patient characteristics are not reported (available
on request). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level. The mean coeﬃ-
cients do differ from those reported in Table 2 for the conditional logit model if there
is less rounding.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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Table A3
Estimated willingness to travel in different choice sets.
30closest 50closest 100closest
Est SE Est SE Est SE
WTT (PROM change) 0.907 0.055*** 0.899 0.056*** 0.904 0.057***
WTT (Readmission rate) −0.604 0.050*** −0.625 0.050*** −0.642 0.051***
WTT (Revision rate) −0.062 0.040 −0.067 0.041 −0.072 0.042
WTT (Mortality rate) −0.069 0.048 −0.068 0.049 −0.070 0.049
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013. Waiting time and quality metrics are
lagged by one year. Willingness to travel (WTT) is the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the average distance to
the chosen hospital. Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level. Full results available on request.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Table A4
Descriptive statistics – emergency sample.
Variable Obs Mean SD ICC
Patient characteristics
Distance travelled (in km) 73,496 14.2 27.1
Distance travelled past closest provider (in km) 73,496 4.2 25.3
Number of providers within 10 km radius 73,496 1.0 1.2
Number of providers within 30 km radius 73,496 5.0 4.7
Age 73,496 80.9 9.8
Male 73,496 0.3 0.4
Past utilisation 73,496 0.7 1.2
Number of Elixhauser conditions 73,496 1.0 1.6
Income deprivation 73,496 0.1 0.1
Provider characteristics
Observed volume 393 187.2 87.0 80.7%
Waiting time (proportion waiting > 120 days) 393 0.2 0.1 43.7%
Change in Oxford Hip Score 393 19.4 1.3 47.9%
28-day emergency readmission rate (%) 393 5.97 2.22 37.0%
1-year revision rate (%) 393 0.95 0.72 22.4%
28-day mortality rate (%) 393 0.20 0.25 4.5%
Obs = Observations; SD = Standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass correlation coeﬃcient.
Notes: Patient characteristics for emergency patients treated between April 2010 and
March 2013.Waiting time and quality metrics are for ﬁnancial years 2009/10 to 2011/
12. Provider characteristics are unweighted. The intraclass correlation coeﬃcient (ICC)
measures the proportion of variation that occurs between providers, rather than over
time.
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